This core could take the form of European investment loans

The crisis has highlighted the issue of public finance, including those of the countries which had been until then to accommodate a debt and growing deficits, under the leadership of the supervisory official but rather mild of the European institutions. After years of complacency of markets, which have barely been more pay the budgetary slippages Greek that they were significantly rewarded (in the form of rate very differentiated and low) German virtue, is that we can see again a differentiation between asked the Greece performance and asked the Germany (to take two extreme situations). Is this the return of a sanction of markets on little virtuous budgetary behaviour Not really, the rate differential that exists between the Greece and the Germany (barely 2.5 points for more than 10 before the Greece join the euro zone) suggests that the markets are aware that the countries of the euro area will allow not the Greece fail.

Prior to monetary Union, a country deteriorated finance saw its currency "attacked", that is sold by the markets. that country devalued or was lacking, without much impact on other European countries. Today, the threat of default of a euro area country has consequences for other countries in this area. A defect in the Greece immediately because the ability to finance other countries deteriorated public finances, such as the Spain, the Ireland and the Portugal. This threat awakens the scepticism on the strength of the euro area: what happens if one-third of the country was lacking cascade At best, a cost of financing sustainable high for many of these countries, at worst, "monetary disunity." For political, even more than economic reasons, markets have therefore understood that the eurozone would save one of its members in difficulty: there is therefore no sanctions of market to finance deteriorated for countries in the euro area.

The European institutions do not punish deteriorated finance. Ironic evidence: only once, in 2005, a country nearly incur sanctions procedures, the Greece, which posted a deficit of 3.2 of GDP. But the Greece has committed to adjustment and avoided sanctions, without really correct: we know today that the Greece 2004 deficit was in fact more than 7 of GDP and it has improved slightly in 2005 and 2006, however in 2007 but a year of strong growth.

The result is that a country with deteriorated finance had little motivation to "adjust": politically, it is a difficult test and does not report much in the short term, while extending the laxity is a strategy without risk (or penalties).

If sticks, must find a (a) core (s) to encourage them to rectify their finances countries which posed such uncertainties on the euro area. This core could take the form of European investment loans. In most of the budgetary adjustments, investment expenditures are greatly reduced, because they are easier to reduce than operating expenses. A solution would be that the EU continues to fund these capital expenditures (via the structural funds or the European Investment Bank), in exchange for a national commitment to rigour. "Compensation" of the difficulties of adjustment by the continuation of investments would also more easily win the accession of the people and would also return a "positive" role in Brussels

Of course, the commitment to be credible, must be that the Parliament of the country in question vote adjustment and its implementation in detail to preserve the democratic process in the country (and to ensure that the membership of any political power). Then, it must be that the disbursement of the funding of the investments will be increments, as is the case in the proceedings of IMF adjustment. Finally, this procedure must be offered to all the countries considered as fragile, at this time: the Ireland, the Spain, the Greece and the Portugal. There is urgency: If Europe does not make something today, the IMF may in two years in the Emergency Department, éraflant passage just over the credibility of the euro.