Some houses have made errors in management

Like the Standard & Poor's rating agency, some consider that current regulatory developments, coupled with the aftermath of the financial crisis, are likely to precipitate the decline of European bancassurance. Under Basel II, the detention of fi subsidiaries of insurance by banks is likely to cost more in capital from 2012. Eric Lombard, President of the French group of the bancassureurs, the G11, and CEO of BNP Paribas Assurance, believes that the word "bancassurance" encompasses very different realities and advises against amal games. Defending the bancassurance model integrated into the French, he explains the "Echos" why the levying capital have counterproductive effects and application policies, in France as in Europe, to return to the record in hand.

What do you think of the idea, from the crisis, to meet across the capital requirements

Be very careful in this very laborious period of crisis, not mistaking battle. In 1929, two tragic errors led to the futility of the crisis and then to the second World War: the fixed exchange rates and the budgetary rigour. Today, the changes are floating and budgetary imbalances are admitted. Yet, as in 1929, it runs the risk of a drying of the financial system. Sources of capital is not unlimited, the own funds requirements too high will lead, side Bank, and side insurance credit drying, drying protection and investment risks. Policy makers must understand that it was necessary, more than before, a financial system that works. The financial system failed Non. Some houses have made errors in management.

There is however a certain distrust for the bancassurance model, with some jewels disappeared.

There is a sterile and fertile models. I represent banking groups with full insurance subsidiaries, and in which insurance trades first serve banking networks. And non-financial conglomerates in which a Bank and insurer are juxtaposed. Allianz-Drs. dner marriage, for example, have never worked well. Conversely, the French, highly integrated model, based on the creation of insurance by banks and the banks. The French bancassureurs crossed the crisis without losing money, in 2007 or 2008. The overall level of own funds should be adequate.

Bancassurance in France still has a future, taking into account the coming regulatory changes, such as Basel II and Solvency II

Our model is excellent for the final consumer. This is not a chance if we win market share: we know our customers and it is very important that they are satisfied. The model is effective because industrial, hence very competitive products, with a capacity of Council recognized. It is also contra-cyclical. During the crisis, insurance activities have been important contributors to the results of our banking groups. Our insurance subsidiaries are cost-effective and properly capitalized. These activities are strategic, provided that the needs of capital remain reasonable, in view of the risk incurred. Overtax the detention of subsidiaries of insurance would be completely contradictory with the fact that the model is strong, effective for the client and less risky.

You see what exit doors

If European regulatory developments called into question our model, that we would have won Kill the financial industry, is to take the risk of killing the entire economy. It is therefore imperative to influence ongoing discussions. It is of course legitimate to give the definition of standards organizations such as IASB (accounting) or the Ceiops (prudential assurance standards). But ultimately, the choice of the level of capital is a political decision. It is for those who govern us regain control on this folder. The issue, it is the success of the out of the crisis.